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ABSTRACT 
I examine the relationship between brick-and-mortar retailers offering price-matching 
guarantees and the atmosphere of their stores.  In an extension of the Hotelling 
model, if a retailer improves the atmosphere of its store, then it raises its price.  
However, with a price-match guarantee and a competitor with a lower-quality store 
and a lower price, some of the retailer’s consumers may demand a price match.  I 
identify the circumstances under which a price-match guarantee prevents a retailer 
from earning increased revenues that may result from improving its in-store 
atmosphere.  In my model, the results depend on the share of consumers who seek 
price matches and the share of consumers who are loyal to the retailer.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The way that consumers make purchasing decisions today has dramatically changed: 
they can easily get information from different retailers, using their computers and 
network to compare prices and product reviews.  Consumers who do not have brand 
loyalty for retailers will like to purchase the goods at the store which offers a lower 
price since the goods are identical in different stores.  To retain consumers, a lot of 
retailers who sell homogeneous goods in the market offer price match guarantees.  
For example, Walmart could match the price to Target, Bestbuy, Sears and vice-versa.  
A "horizontal price match policy" matches the lower price of the same product with 
that of competitors.  The "horizontal price match policy" usually has two forms: 
match the price immediately or match after the purchase.  If consumers want to 
purchase goods from a retailer but find out the same goods in the competitor’s store 
are at the better deal, consumers can prove it when they check out and buy at a lower 
price.  In addition, consumers could also submit their request for a price adjustment 
within a specified period after the purchase and the price difference of the identical 
products in two stores will be refunded to consumers.   
What’s more, Consumers now buy products not only because they need the 
products physically but also because they could be satisfied mentally by means of 
such products. The store atmosphere will generate specific emotional effects on the 
buyers, playing an important part of the decision-making process of the consumer.  
For example, a decent shopping environment and good service will increase the 
incentives of the consumers to buy products in this store.  Therefore, in order to 
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obtain some competitive advantages, some retailers allocate investment resources to 
create good store atmosphere. [1] 
At first glance, only retailers that have low in-store atmospheres will offer price 
match guarantees.  However, because all consumers do not demand that a retailer 
match a competitor’s lower price, and consumers prefer shopping at stores with nice 
atmospheres, retailers may be willing to spend resources to improve the store’s 
atmosphere. Not all consumers demand price-matching for the following two reasons.  
First, some consumers may consider purchasing at multiple retailers, and even know 
that a competitor has set a lower price.  However, these consumers may not be 
willing to spend time asking for a price match.  Second, other consumers may be 
loyal to a particular retailer and may be uninformed about competitors’ prices.   
    One crucial observation is that retailers in a competitive relationship will set the 
same price for the same period.  It is also important to explain in which conditions 
retailers should invest in improving their in-store atmosphere and in what conditions 
retailers should offer only basic, spartan stores.  
    In this paper, consumers are assigned three categories: the general consumer who 
will invoke their right under price-matching guarantee, the loyal consumer, and the 
general consumers who neglect the price-matching policy.  I set up a Hotelling 
model to see how retailers react in setting price and investment for store ambience.  I 
found out they will set the highest Nash equilibrium price among several Nash 
equilibria prices and Nash equilibrium investment in in-store atmosphere.  If there 
are not loyal consumers, both retailer will not invest in store ambience.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides related 
literature that I reviewed.  I set up the model in Section 3 and analyze different cases 
of price setting in Section 4. In Section 5, I draw conclusions.  
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Cooperation and competition are two important economic activities for retailers. 
However, coordination also exists in competing companies and they do not have to 
discuss it. 
Belton (1987) set up duopoly model that two firms producing differentiated 
products to analyze the effect of meeting competition clauses (MCCs).  Belton 
(1987) made the conclusions that MCC reduces the competition and leads to a price 
increase above non- cooperative levels by both firms [2]  
In Png and Hirshleifer (1987), price matching policy was treated as special price 
discrimination that happens in competition.  In addition, if there are a certain number 
of firms and the firms coordinate the pricing, they could discriminate more effectively 
and gain more profits by selling to customers at a lower opportunity cost. [3] 
Moorthy and Winter (2006) assumed that the information about prices is costly 
because buyers will spend a lot of time in comparing different prices in different 
stores to find the best deal, but the pricing policies of retailers are not expensive to 
find.  They found that the price match guarantees serve as a signal for their relative 
low-price position which attracts more consumers who are not informed about the 
prices of competitive stores. Price match guarantees are anti-competitive. [4]  On a 
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different perspective, Caminal and Claici (2007) who did the research about the 
effects of loyalty programs on competition found that loyalty-rewarding pricing 
schemes have a pro-competitive effect and hence they reduce average prices. [5] 
Those essays state the effects of competition.  In my paper, I take both price 
match guarantees and loyalty consumers into consideration. I found that the combined 
effect is pro-competitive, using a Hotelling model to find the specific demand related 
to two retailers’ price and the in-store ambience.  What’s more, I take the proportion 
of people who are willing to ask for price-match and loyalty consumer into 
consideration to see whether those two segments of people will influence retailers’ 
decisions. 
 
3.  THE MODEL 
We assume that two retailers (denoted 1 and 2) are located at the extreme locations of 
the [0,1]interval,	'(, sell a homogeneous product at their own retail price,	)*,	)+, and 
the same constant marginal cost, c.  Two retailers all have "horizontal price match 
policy" and they will match their price to the competitors’ lower price if consumers 
submit requirements so that they could prevent their customers from shifting to rival 
retailers.  To attract loyal customers, both Retailers also have the incentive to invest 
in store ambience,	,*, ,+, to improve the shop quality perceived by consumers at the 
cost of k, and the desired store atmosphere also benefits customers who are not loyal 
consumer scaled by -, which is positive. 
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I divided all consumers into three types in this paper: Consumers who aware of 
the "horizontal price match policy" and are willing to apply for a price adjustment 
with a share of all consumers, ..  We assume that there is no cost for searching for 
the price information in different stores and invoking price match guarantees.  There 
is a share of all consumers, / (between 0 and 1), Loyal Consumer, who are 
committed to one of the retailers not matter how the price of another retailer changes.  
Therefore, the share of loyal consumers for retailer 1 and retailer 2 is //2 
respectively.  The rest of consumers, 1 − λ − /, who are unaware of such policy or 
unwilling to put effort into the application of price refund.  
From the perspective of the consumer, consumers are uniformly distributed on 
the unit interval, 4 and bear a unit travel cost, τ.  A consumer’s basic indirect utility 
equals to the reservation income, 5, plus the gain from store atmosphere, -,(, then 
minus unit travel cost, τ, times distance, |'( − 4|	and then minus price, which is 
written as 5 + -,( − 8|'( − 4| − )( .  What’s more, if the price of one retailer is less 
than another retailer, it will sell at the price that it set for all its consumers.  If the 
product of one retailer is more expensive than another retailer, a part of its consumers 
who know the policy will submit the requests of price match and buy the product at 
the same price that another retailer set. 
The profit functions of retailer 1 and 2 are: 
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4.  ANALYSIS 
In this section, I start with the normal case when two retailers set the same price and 
find the Nash equilibrium level of investment they will set.   
After retailers set their prices, for the people who will not seek for the price 
match,1 − λ − δ	shares of all consumers, there is exactly one consumer x; who is 
indifferent from buying in retailer 1 or buying in retailer 2: 
5 + -,* − 8	|4;| 	− )* = 5 + -,+ − 	8	|1 − 4;| −	)+ 
4; = 12 + ()+ − )*) + -(,* − ,+)28  
    The demand of the general consumer who will not seek for the price match for 
retailer 1 and 2 are:      
D**()*, )+) = 4; = 12 + ()+ − )*) + -(,* − ,+)28  
	D+*()*, )+) = 1 − 4; = 12 + ()* − )+) + -(,+ − ,*)28  
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Since general consumer who will invoke price match policy will buy the 
identical product at the same price from either of two retailers, p* = p+, the demand 
for retailer 1 and 2 are: D*+()*, )+) = 12 + -(,* − ,+)28  
D++()*, )+) = 12 + -(,+ − ,*)28  
For loyal consumers, they have a linear demand with price, p	and investment in 
store atmosphere, q, which is: D*B = ()*, ,*) = ,* − )* 
D+B = ()+, ,+) = ,+ − )+ 
Therefore, the profit functions of retailer 1 and 2 are: 
 
 
Proposition 1. The stage-2 price setting game has a continuum of Nash equilibria.  
Specifically, any )*∗ = )+∗ ∈ E(FGHFGIFJKH)LMG(FGHFGIF)LNJ(*GIGHJKH)OJ(*GIGH)K*GIGHJ+KH ,(FGHFJKH)LMG(FGHF)LNJ(*GIGHJKH)OJ(*GH)K*GIGHJ+KH P is a Nash equilibrium.    
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    When we take the derivative of the profit of a retailer to its own price and set it 
equals to 0, we get the best response of that retailer. 
The best response function of retailer 1 and retailer 2 respectively is: 
 
We could see the Figure 1 that a retailer will increase its price as the price of the 
rival increase and end up setting the same price.  We could find the range of Nash 
equilibria by setting the same price in the best response function of retailer 1.  In 
other words, find the intersections of the best response function of retailer 1 and the 
forty-five-degree line.  There are multiple Nash equilibria ranging from )Q∗ 	=(FGHFGIFJKH)LMG(FGHFGIF)LNJ(*GIGHJKH)OJ(*GIGH)K*GIGHJ+KH 	to )R∗ 		=(FGHFJKH)LMG(FGHF)LNJ(*GIGHJKH)OJ(*GH)K*GIGHJ+KH .  Both retailers have no incentive to deviate 
from Nash equilibrium price (proof. See the appendix) and have the incentive to set 
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the highest Nash equilibrium price )R∗ .  What’s more, if there is not consumer 
implement price match (λ = 0), )Q∗ = )R∗ 	.  Therefore, there are several symmetric 
Nash equilibria of prices set by retailers due to the existence of price match 
consumers. 
Corollary 1.  The stage-2 Nash equilibrium prices, )*∗ and )+∗,	are increasing in 
one firm’s investment, ,*	and cost,	c, and decreasing in the other firm’s investment, ,+. 
A retailer will set a higher retail price when the price of its rival increases, the 
investment of store ambience of its rival decreases or the investment of store 
ambience of its own increases.  Since 1 − λ − δ ∈ [0,1], (1 − /) ∈ [0,1], (1 − .) ∈[0,1], 8 > 0, - > 0.  The best response of the price for a retailer has a positive 
correlation with its own quality level and another retailer’s price but has a negative 
correlation with another retailer’s quality level.  
We will focus on the greatest of the stage-2 Nash equilibria.  Specifically, )*∗ 		= )+∗ = (FGHFJKH)*GIGHJ+KH ,* − (FGHF)*GIGHJ+KH ,+ + (*GIGHJKH)*GIGHJ+KH c + (*GH)K*GIGHJ+KH.	  
 
Proposition 2.  The symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in-store atmospheres is: 
,*∗ 	= 	,+∗ = /+8[2-(1− /) + (1 − 28)/ + (. − 1)]V + (2- + 1)(/ − 1)+ + 28(1− /) + .(/ − 1)4X[4/+8+ + 4/8(1 − . − /) + (1 − . − /)+] + /+8[2-(/ − 1) + (. + / − 1) − 28/]  
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Corollary 2.  The stage-1 subgame perfect equilibrium store atmospheres, 	,*∗ and ,+∗, are increasing in the share of people who will invoke their right under 
price-matching guarantee, . and decreasing in the share of loyal customers, /.  
    In graph 2, when ,* ≥ ,+, the best response function of retailer 1 will shift to 
the right and the best response function of retailer 2 will shift to the left.  Two 
retailers will still set the highest symmetric Nash equilibrium at 
)∗ 	= (/- − -)1 − . − / + 28/ ,* + (- − /- + 8/)1 − . − / + 28/ ,+ − (1 − . − / + 8/)1 − . − / + 28/ V + (1 − /)81 − . − / + 28/ 
Solve for the first-order condition of profit maximization π* respect to its own 
quality level (,*) under this condition, we get 
[,1 = (1 − /)(/- − -)	[12 + -(,* − ,+)28 ]1 − . − / + 28/ + -(1 − /)()∗ − V)28 + (/- − -)/(,* − )∗)1 − . − / + 28/ + /()∗ − V)	(1 − /- − -1 − . − / + 28/)2 − 2X,* 
\)	Especially, when δ = 0; 0 ≤ λ < 1, there are no loyal customers, the first-order 
condition of profit maximization π* is negative. 
[,1 = 	-+(,+ − ,*)8(1 − .) − 2X,*	
    Therefore, a retailer does not have the incentive to invest in its quality when 
there are no loyal customers and customers will not match the price.  Solve for 
symmetric Nash equilibrium, ,*∗ 	= 	 ,+∗ = 0.  Both retailers will set a Nash 
equilibrium price 
)*∗ 	= 	)+∗ = (1 − /)81 − . − / + 28/ − (1 − . − / + 8/)V1 − . − / + 28/  
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\\) When 0 < δ < 1; 0 < λ < 1; ,*∗ 	= 	 ,+∗, we found the level investment, ,∗	,  
that maximize the profit. 
/+8[2-(1 − /) + (1 − 28)/ + (. − 1)]V + (2- + 1)(/ − 1)+ + 28(1 − /) + .(/ − 1)4X[4/+8+ + 4/8(1 − . − /) + (1 − . − /)+] + /+8[2-(/ − 1) + (. + / − 1) − 28/]  
 
When I set - = 1, X = 1, 8 = 1, V = 0	 ,∗ = /(δ+ + (λ − 4)/ + (3 − .))/B + (. + 1)/+ + 8 ∗ (1 − .)/ + 4(. − 1)+ 
 
Because 0 < δ < 1; 0 < λ < 1, ,∗ > 0. Especially, when / = 1,	 ,∗ = 0.  
 
Therefore, if k=1, when there are not loyal customers, or all the customers are 
loyal customers, both retailers will set zero quality investment.  Otherwise, both 
retailers will set the same symmetric Nash equilibrium quality (q∗).  What’s more, 
for the lower proportion of loyal customers, the symmetric Nash equilibrium quality 
that two retailers set will increase in the proportion of loyal customers, δ.  But for 
the higher value of the proportion of loyal customers, the symmetric Nash equilibrium 
quality that two retailers set will decrease in the proportion of loyal customers, δ.  In 
sum, If there exist loyal customers, both retailers will set the same positive quality 
investment. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I prove that the price match policy can soften competition and that 
retailers will not deviate from the Nash-equilibrium price.  In addition, retailers will 
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invest the same amount in in-store ambience to attract more loyal customers.  
Otherwise, the retailers have no incentive to improve their in-store ambience. 
    I first set up a duopoly Hotelling model to get the market share for 2 retails. 
There is a trade-off between modifying the price and the demand.  Price match 
policy helps retailers to retain consumers so as not to buy the identical product at a 
lower price from competitors.  A reduction in price is not profitable because the 
competitors will match the lower price and profit will not increase.  Therefore, 
retailers will divide the market equally at the highest price of a continuum of Nash-
equilibria prices because some consumers will ask for the price match.  At the 
second stage, retailers will set the Nash-equilibrium investment.  If there are loyal 
consumers, the Nash-equilibrium investment will be positive and if there are not loyal 
consumers, the Nash-equilibrium investment will be zero. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.  In this assumed two retailers model, each retailer has two 
profit functions because the retailer will set the lowest price of the prices set by two 
retailers for consumers who will implement price match policy.  
Case 1. When )* > )+,  π* = ()* − V)(1 − . − /)d12 + ()+ − )*) + -(,* − ,+)28 e + .(	)+ − V)(12 + -(,* − ,+)28 )+ /2 (	)* − V)(,* − )*)− X,*+					 
Take the derivative of the profit of retailer 1 respect to the price of retailer 1 and 
the result is:  fπ*f)* = 12τ (1 − λ − δ)(τ + )+ − 2)* + V + α(,* − ,+)) + α2 (,* − 2)* + V) 
 
    Let )*∗ 	= 	)+∗ = 	)Q∗, ijMikM = 0; Let )*∗ 	= 	)+∗ = 	)R∗ , ijMikM = − (KJF(LMGLN))I+K <0.  Therefore, when )* > )+, as price of retailer 1 increase, the profit of retailer 1 
decrease. 	
Case 2. When )* ≤ )+,  
 π* =		 ()* − V)(1 − . − /)d12 + ()+ − )*) + -(,* − ,+)28 e + .(	)* − V)(12 + -(,* − ,+)28 )+ /2 (	)* − V)(,* − )*) − X,*+							
    Take the derivative of the profit of retailer 1 respect to the price of retailer 1 and 
the result is: fπ*f)* = 12τ [(1 − λ − δ)(τ + )+ − 2)* + V + α(,* − ,+)) + λ(τ + α(,* − ,+)]+ α2 (,* − 2)* + V) 
    Let )*∗ 	= 	)+∗ = 	)Q∗, ijMikM = (KJF(lMGlN))I+K > 0; Let )*∗ 	= 	)+∗ = 	)R∗ , ijMikM = 0.  
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Therefore, when )* ≤ )+, as the price of retailer 1 increase, the profit of retailer 
1 increase.  In sum, the retailer 1 will set the same price as retailer 2. There are 
several symmetric Nash equilibria. 
 
Figure 1: Multiple Nash equilibria prices for retailers 	
 
Figure 2: Multiple Nash equilibria prices for retailers when q* ≥ q+ 
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